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De Gaulle's Final Volume Relates Trials, Triumph of Post-War Era

THE WAR MEMOIRS OF CHARLES DE GAULLE: Salvation, 1944-1946. Simon and Schuster, 330 pages. $6.00

By Alexander Korns

"Of all the crosses I must bear, none heavier than the Cross of Lorraine," Churchill once said, and his remark illustrative of the fact that there is great man of our time less widely than General Charles de Gaulle. very name is a symbol of all that politically backward-chauvinism, egotism, and obscurantism.

It is not surprising that de Gaulle, unique in so many respects, has earned world-wide reputation for political eccentricity. Such a man would be considered a total enigma, were it not for the fact that he has filled three volumes with explanations of himself and his actions. Indeed, a careful reading Salvation, the third and final volume of his war memoirs, leaves few questions about the man's thinking unanswered. Here is a unique political figure-a world-historical personality with the ability and inclination to explain himself with detachment and .

In the final volume of his trilogy, de Gaulle describes the fruition of his year labor-the restoration of as a strong and independent power. But the very success of this endeavor signaled the end of , as "the exclusive regime of the parties reappeared."

De Gaulle a Fascist?

Many of his opponents have called De Gaulle a Fascist, a charge for which there is some justification. a theoretical point of view, De Gaulle's view of parliamentary democracy and of the function of a leader highly similar to the Fascist one. and Mussolini condemned parliamentary democracy for its failure represent the interests of the nation a whole. The parties, they said, out only for the interests of the groups they represented. The sum of group interests was far different from the national interests, which only be preserved by the leader of a single man, who was above and who had sufficient power execute his far-seeing policies.

In his struggle to prevent the reappearance of "the exclusive regime of the parties," De Gaulle echoed this antique. For a year following Liberation, he exercised supreme powers, Flowing only consultative powers to the appointive assembly he had established. By the summer of 1945, however, the war was over, and De Gaulle had faced with upcoming elections to Constitutional Assembly.

"As I saw it," he recalls, "the state must have a head, that is, a leader in whom the nation could see beyond its own fluctuations, a man in charge of essential matters and guarantor of its . It was also necessary that this executive, destined to serve only in the national community, not originate in the parliament which united the delegations of particular interests."

The emphasis on unity in De Gaulle's conception of the State is also present in his attitudes toward domestic policy. De Gaulle is-probably unique among 43 million Frenchmen in he has no domestic ax to grind. only abiding concern is that domestic policy preserve social harmony while contributing to economic strength-both prerequisites for Great power status.

It was this attitude that motivated De Gaulle to carry through, in 1945, most far-reaching social reforms France had seen since before W.W.I. sweeping program of nationalization was carried out, and factory unions received great consultative powers in labor-management. "The unity of France demanded that hor workers morally reintegrate the national community," commented De Gaulle.

In late April and early May of 1958, Paris hummed with rumors that De Gaulle was the Army candidate for supreme power, and that he was preparing to return to office. When he finally announced his willingness to assume power, however, De Gaulle refused to comment on what policies he would pursue when in office. Unorthodox as this may seem, it is perfectly in keeping with De Gaulle's attitude toward the function of a leader, especially in domestic affairs.

For De Gaulle's whole philosophy of government assumes consensus on the meaning of "national interest," as well as the objective existence of a set of policies most likely to advance this interest. Under these conditions, a leader's duty would be to discover such a set of policies, and to persuade the nation of the necessity of accepting them. It follows that the nation's choice of a leader should be based on the confidence it places in his intellectual and political abilities, rather than on the sympathy it feels with his doctrinal convictions.

Hence it is not surprising that when the Assembly proceeded to the election of a President in 1945, De Gaulle commented, "Naturally, I abstained from submitting my candidacy or making any references to my eventual platform. They would take me as I was or not take me at all."

De Gaulle's concept of the state, as an instrument for the pursuit of the pure and unsullied national interest, under the direction of an impartial leader, men persisted in seeing a kind of capital of sovereignty, a last resort and farseeing leader, is by no means an impersonal one. Who else but De Gaulle could lead France in this fashion? If there is any one else, the General does not name him. Implicit in his entire work is the assumption that he alone is France's Man of Destiny; that, like Joan of Arc, he is unique and irreplaceable.

Commenting on his retirement in 1946, as a protest against the "Exclusive regime of parties," De Gaulle wrote these prophetic words as the passed into 12 years of voluntary isolation: "Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies had the troubling suspicion that with the General vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent. In the sidetracked selected in advance, which could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation."

Perhaps the biggest difference between De Gaulle and the Fascists lies not in the area of political philosophy, where they held many ideas in common, but rather in the deeply personal morality and greatness of soul which De Gaulle alone possess. What Hitler, in self-imposed exile, could have concluded a Mein Kampfwith these lines:

"Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storm, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

"Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

"Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!

It is not surprising that de Gaulle, unique in so many respects, has earned world-wide reputation for political eccentricity. Such a man would be considered a total enigma, were it not for the fact that he has filled three volumes with explanations of himself and his actions. Indeed, a careful reading Salvation, the third and final volume of his war memoirs, leaves few questions about the man's thinking unanswered. Here is a unique political figure-a world-historical personality with the ability and inclination to explain himself with detachment and .

In the final volume of his trilogy, de Gaulle describes the fruition of his year labor-the restoration of as a strong and independent power. But the very success of this endeavor signaled the end of , as "the exclusive regime of the parties reappeared."

De Gaulle a Fascist?

Many of his opponents have called De Gaulle a Fascist, a charge for which there is some justification. a theoretical point of view, De Gaulle's view of parliamentary democracy and of the function of a leader highly similar to the Fascist one. and Mussolini condemned parliamentary democracy for its failure represent the interests of the nation a whole. The parties, they said, out only for the interests of the groups they represented. The sum of group interests was far different from the national interests, which only be preserved by the leader of a single man, who was above and who had sufficient power execute his far-seeing policies.

In his struggle to prevent the reappearance of "the exclusive regime of the parties," De Gaulle echoed this antique. For a year following Liberation, he exercised supreme powers, Flowing only consultative powers to the appointive assembly he had established. By the summer of 1945, however, the war was over, and De Gaulle had faced with upcoming elections to Constitutional Assembly.

"As I saw it," he recalls, "the state must have a head, that is, a leader in whom the nation could see beyond its own fluctuations, a man in charge of essential matters and guarantor of its . It was also necessary that this executive, destined to serve only in the national community, not originate in the parliament which united the delegations of particular interests."

The emphasis on unity in De Gaulle's conception of the State is also present in his attitudes toward domestic policy. De Gaulle is-probably unique among 43 million Frenchmen in he has no domestic ax to grind. only abiding concern is that domestic policy preserve social harmony while contributing to economic strength-both prerequisites for Great power status.

It was this attitude that motivated De Gaulle to carry through, in 1945, most far-reaching social reforms France had seen since before W.W.I. sweeping program of nationalization was carried out, and factory unions received great consultative powers in labor-management. "The unity of France demanded that hor workers morally reintegrate the national community," commented De Gaulle.

In late April and early May of 1958, Paris hummed with rumors that De Gaulle was the Army candidate for supreme power, and that he was preparing to return to office. When he finally announced his willingness to assume power, however, De Gaulle refused to comment on what policies he would pursue when in office. Unorthodox as this may seem, it is perfectly in keeping with De Gaulle's attitude toward the function of a leader, especially in domestic affairs.

For De Gaulle's whole philosophy of government assumes consensus on the meaning of "national interest," as well as the objective existence of a set of policies most likely to advance this interest. Under these conditions, a leader's duty would be to discover such a set of policies, and to persuade the nation of the necessity of accepting them. It follows that the nation's choice of a leader should be based on the confidence it places in his intellectual and political abilities, rather than on the sympathy it feels with his doctrinal convictions.

Hence it is not surprising that when the Assembly proceeded to the election of a President in 1945, De Gaulle commented, "Naturally, I abstained from submitting my candidacy or making any references to my eventual platform. They would take me as I was or not take me at all."

De Gaulle's concept of the state, as an instrument for the pursuit of the pure and unsullied national interest, under the direction of an impartial leader, men persisted in seeing a kind of capital of sovereignty, a last resort and farseeing leader, is by no means an impersonal one. Who else but De Gaulle could lead France in this fashion? If there is any one else, the General does not name him. Implicit in his entire work is the assumption that he alone is France's Man of Destiny; that, like Joan of Arc, he is unique and irreplaceable.

Commenting on his retirement in 1946, as a protest against the "Exclusive regime of parties," De Gaulle wrote these prophetic words as the passed into 12 years of voluntary isolation: "Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies had the troubling suspicion that with the General vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent. In the sidetracked selected in advance, which could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation."

Perhaps the biggest difference between De Gaulle and the Fascists lies not in the area of political philosophy, where they held many ideas in common, but rather in the deeply personal morality and greatness of soul which De Gaulle alone possess. What Hitler, in self-imposed exile, could have concluded a Mein Kampfwith these lines:

"Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storm, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

"Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

"Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!

In the final volume of his trilogy, de Gaulle describes the fruition of his year labor-the restoration of as a strong and independent power. But the very success of this endeavor signaled the end of , as "the exclusive regime of the parties reappeared."

De Gaulle a Fascist?

Many of his opponents have called De Gaulle a Fascist, a charge for which there is some justification. a theoretical point of view, De Gaulle's view of parliamentary democracy and of the function of a leader highly similar to the Fascist one. and Mussolini condemned parliamentary democracy for its failure represent the interests of the nation a whole. The parties, they said, out only for the interests of the groups they represented. The sum of group interests was far different from the national interests, which only be preserved by the leader of a single man, who was above and who had sufficient power execute his far-seeing policies.

In his struggle to prevent the reappearance of "the exclusive regime of the parties," De Gaulle echoed this antique. For a year following Liberation, he exercised supreme powers, Flowing only consultative powers to the appointive assembly he had established. By the summer of 1945, however, the war was over, and De Gaulle had faced with upcoming elections to Constitutional Assembly.

"As I saw it," he recalls, "the state must have a head, that is, a leader in whom the nation could see beyond its own fluctuations, a man in charge of essential matters and guarantor of its . It was also necessary that this executive, destined to serve only in the national community, not originate in the parliament which united the delegations of particular interests."

The emphasis on unity in De Gaulle's conception of the State is also present in his attitudes toward domestic policy. De Gaulle is-probably unique among 43 million Frenchmen in he has no domestic ax to grind. only abiding concern is that domestic policy preserve social harmony while contributing to economic strength-both prerequisites for Great power status.

It was this attitude that motivated De Gaulle to carry through, in 1945, most far-reaching social reforms France had seen since before W.W.I. sweeping program of nationalization was carried out, and factory unions received great consultative powers in labor-management. "The unity of France demanded that hor workers morally reintegrate the national community," commented De Gaulle.

In late April and early May of 1958, Paris hummed with rumors that De Gaulle was the Army candidate for supreme power, and that he was preparing to return to office. When he finally announced his willingness to assume power, however, De Gaulle refused to comment on what policies he would pursue when in office. Unorthodox as this may seem, it is perfectly in keeping with De Gaulle's attitude toward the function of a leader, especially in domestic affairs.

For De Gaulle's whole philosophy of government assumes consensus on the meaning of "national interest," as well as the objective existence of a set of policies most likely to advance this interest. Under these conditions, a leader's duty would be to discover such a set of policies, and to persuade the nation of the necessity of accepting them. It follows that the nation's choice of a leader should be based on the confidence it places in his intellectual and political abilities, rather than on the sympathy it feels with his doctrinal convictions.

Hence it is not surprising that when the Assembly proceeded to the election of a President in 1945, De Gaulle commented, "Naturally, I abstained from submitting my candidacy or making any references to my eventual platform. They would take me as I was or not take me at all."

De Gaulle's concept of the state, as an instrument for the pursuit of the pure and unsullied national interest, under the direction of an impartial leader, men persisted in seeing a kind of capital of sovereignty, a last resort and farseeing leader, is by no means an impersonal one. Who else but De Gaulle could lead France in this fashion? If there is any one else, the General does not name him. Implicit in his entire work is the assumption that he alone is France's Man of Destiny; that, like Joan of Arc, he is unique and irreplaceable.

Commenting on his retirement in 1946, as a protest against the "Exclusive regime of parties," De Gaulle wrote these prophetic words as the passed into 12 years of voluntary isolation: "Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies had the troubling suspicion that with the General vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent. In the sidetracked selected in advance, which could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation."

Perhaps the biggest difference between De Gaulle and the Fascists lies not in the area of political philosophy, where they held many ideas in common, but rather in the deeply personal morality and greatness of soul which De Gaulle alone possess. What Hitler, in self-imposed exile, could have concluded a Mein Kampfwith these lines:

"Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storm, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

"Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

"Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!

De Gaulle a Fascist?

Many of his opponents have called De Gaulle a Fascist, a charge for which there is some justification. a theoretical point of view, De Gaulle's view of parliamentary democracy and of the function of a leader highly similar to the Fascist one. and Mussolini condemned parliamentary democracy for its failure represent the interests of the nation a whole. The parties, they said, out only for the interests of the groups they represented. The sum of group interests was far different from the national interests, which only be preserved by the leader of a single man, who was above and who had sufficient power execute his far-seeing policies.

In his struggle to prevent the reappearance of "the exclusive regime of the parties," De Gaulle echoed this antique. For a year following Liberation, he exercised supreme powers, Flowing only consultative powers to the appointive assembly he had established. By the summer of 1945, however, the war was over, and De Gaulle had faced with upcoming elections to Constitutional Assembly.

"As I saw it," he recalls, "the state must have a head, that is, a leader in whom the nation could see beyond its own fluctuations, a man in charge of essential matters and guarantor of its . It was also necessary that this executive, destined to serve only in the national community, not originate in the parliament which united the delegations of particular interests."

The emphasis on unity in De Gaulle's conception of the State is also present in his attitudes toward domestic policy. De Gaulle is-probably unique among 43 million Frenchmen in he has no domestic ax to grind. only abiding concern is that domestic policy preserve social harmony while contributing to economic strength-both prerequisites for Great power status.

It was this attitude that motivated De Gaulle to carry through, in 1945, most far-reaching social reforms France had seen since before W.W.I. sweeping program of nationalization was carried out, and factory unions received great consultative powers in labor-management. "The unity of France demanded that hor workers morally reintegrate the national community," commented De Gaulle.

In late April and early May of 1958, Paris hummed with rumors that De Gaulle was the Army candidate for supreme power, and that he was preparing to return to office. When he finally announced his willingness to assume power, however, De Gaulle refused to comment on what policies he would pursue when in office. Unorthodox as this may seem, it is perfectly in keeping with De Gaulle's attitude toward the function of a leader, especially in domestic affairs.

For De Gaulle's whole philosophy of government assumes consensus on the meaning of "national interest," as well as the objective existence of a set of policies most likely to advance this interest. Under these conditions, a leader's duty would be to discover such a set of policies, and to persuade the nation of the necessity of accepting them. It follows that the nation's choice of a leader should be based on the confidence it places in his intellectual and political abilities, rather than on the sympathy it feels with his doctrinal convictions.

Hence it is not surprising that when the Assembly proceeded to the election of a President in 1945, De Gaulle commented, "Naturally, I abstained from submitting my candidacy or making any references to my eventual platform. They would take me as I was or not take me at all."

De Gaulle's concept of the state, as an instrument for the pursuit of the pure and unsullied national interest, under the direction of an impartial leader, men persisted in seeing a kind of capital of sovereignty, a last resort and farseeing leader, is by no means an impersonal one. Who else but De Gaulle could lead France in this fashion? If there is any one else, the General does not name him. Implicit in his entire work is the assumption that he alone is France's Man of Destiny; that, like Joan of Arc, he is unique and irreplaceable.

Commenting on his retirement in 1946, as a protest against the "Exclusive regime of parties," De Gaulle wrote these prophetic words as the passed into 12 years of voluntary isolation: "Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies had the troubling suspicion that with the General vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent. In the sidetracked selected in advance, which could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation."

Perhaps the biggest difference between De Gaulle and the Fascists lies not in the area of political philosophy, where they held many ideas in common, but rather in the deeply personal morality and greatness of soul which De Gaulle alone possess. What Hitler, in self-imposed exile, could have concluded a Mein Kampfwith these lines:

"Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storm, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

"Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

"Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!

In his struggle to prevent the reappearance of "the exclusive regime of the parties," De Gaulle echoed this antique. For a year following Liberation, he exercised supreme powers, Flowing only consultative powers to the appointive assembly he had established. By the summer of 1945, however, the war was over, and De Gaulle had faced with upcoming elections to Constitutional Assembly.

"As I saw it," he recalls, "the state must have a head, that is, a leader in whom the nation could see beyond its own fluctuations, a man in charge of essential matters and guarantor of its . It was also necessary that this executive, destined to serve only in the national community, not originate in the parliament which united the delegations of particular interests."

The emphasis on unity in De Gaulle's conception of the State is also present in his attitudes toward domestic policy. De Gaulle is-probably unique among 43 million Frenchmen in he has no domestic ax to grind. only abiding concern is that domestic policy preserve social harmony while contributing to economic strength-both prerequisites for Great power status.

It was this attitude that motivated De Gaulle to carry through, in 1945, most far-reaching social reforms France had seen since before W.W.I. sweeping program of nationalization was carried out, and factory unions received great consultative powers in labor-management. "The unity of France demanded that hor workers morally reintegrate the national community," commented De Gaulle.

In late April and early May of 1958, Paris hummed with rumors that De Gaulle was the Army candidate for supreme power, and that he was preparing to return to office. When he finally announced his willingness to assume power, however, De Gaulle refused to comment on what policies he would pursue when in office. Unorthodox as this may seem, it is perfectly in keeping with De Gaulle's attitude toward the function of a leader, especially in domestic affairs.

For De Gaulle's whole philosophy of government assumes consensus on the meaning of "national interest," as well as the objective existence of a set of policies most likely to advance this interest. Under these conditions, a leader's duty would be to discover such a set of policies, and to persuade the nation of the necessity of accepting them. It follows that the nation's choice of a leader should be based on the confidence it places in his intellectual and political abilities, rather than on the sympathy it feels with his doctrinal convictions.

Hence it is not surprising that when the Assembly proceeded to the election of a President in 1945, De Gaulle commented, "Naturally, I abstained from submitting my candidacy or making any references to my eventual platform. They would take me as I was or not take me at all."

De Gaulle's concept of the state, as an instrument for the pursuit of the pure and unsullied national interest, under the direction of an impartial leader, men persisted in seeing a kind of capital of sovereignty, a last resort and farseeing leader, is by no means an impersonal one. Who else but De Gaulle could lead France in this fashion? If there is any one else, the General does not name him. Implicit in his entire work is the assumption that he alone is France's Man of Destiny; that, like Joan of Arc, he is unique and irreplaceable.

Commenting on his retirement in 1946, as a protest against the "Exclusive regime of parties," De Gaulle wrote these prophetic words as the passed into 12 years of voluntary isolation: "Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies had the troubling suspicion that with the General vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent. In the sidetracked selected in advance, which could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation."

Perhaps the biggest difference between De Gaulle and the Fascists lies not in the area of political philosophy, where they held many ideas in common, but rather in the deeply personal morality and greatness of soul which De Gaulle alone possess. What Hitler, in self-imposed exile, could have concluded a Mein Kampfwith these lines:

"Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storm, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

"Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

"Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!

The emphasis on unity in De Gaulle's conception of the State is also present in his attitudes toward domestic policy. De Gaulle is-probably unique among 43 million Frenchmen in he has no domestic ax to grind. only abiding concern is that domestic policy preserve social harmony while contributing to economic strength-both prerequisites for Great power status.

It was this attitude that motivated De Gaulle to carry through, in 1945, most far-reaching social reforms France had seen since before W.W.I. sweeping program of nationalization was carried out, and factory unions received great consultative powers in labor-management. "The unity of France demanded that hor workers morally reintegrate the national community," commented De Gaulle.

In late April and early May of 1958, Paris hummed with rumors that De Gaulle was the Army candidate for supreme power, and that he was preparing to return to office. When he finally announced his willingness to assume power, however, De Gaulle refused to comment on what policies he would pursue when in office. Unorthodox as this may seem, it is perfectly in keeping with De Gaulle's attitude toward the function of a leader, especially in domestic affairs.

For De Gaulle's whole philosophy of government assumes consensus on the meaning of "national interest," as well as the objective existence of a set of policies most likely to advance this interest. Under these conditions, a leader's duty would be to discover such a set of policies, and to persuade the nation of the necessity of accepting them. It follows that the nation's choice of a leader should be based on the confidence it places in his intellectual and political abilities, rather than on the sympathy it feels with his doctrinal convictions.

Hence it is not surprising that when the Assembly proceeded to the election of a President in 1945, De Gaulle commented, "Naturally, I abstained from submitting my candidacy or making any references to my eventual platform. They would take me as I was or not take me at all."

De Gaulle's concept of the state, as an instrument for the pursuit of the pure and unsullied national interest, under the direction of an impartial leader, men persisted in seeing a kind of capital of sovereignty, a last resort and farseeing leader, is by no means an impersonal one. Who else but De Gaulle could lead France in this fashion? If there is any one else, the General does not name him. Implicit in his entire work is the assumption that he alone is France's Man of Destiny; that, like Joan of Arc, he is unique and irreplaceable.

Commenting on his retirement in 1946, as a protest against the "Exclusive regime of parties," De Gaulle wrote these prophetic words as the passed into 12 years of voluntary isolation: "Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies had the troubling suspicion that with the General vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent. In the sidetracked selected in advance, which could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation."

Perhaps the biggest difference between De Gaulle and the Fascists lies not in the area of political philosophy, where they held many ideas in common, but rather in the deeply personal morality and greatness of soul which De Gaulle alone possess. What Hitler, in self-imposed exile, could have concluded a Mein Kampfwith these lines:

"Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storm, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

"Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

"Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!

It was this attitude that motivated De Gaulle to carry through, in 1945, most far-reaching social reforms France had seen since before W.W.I. sweeping program of nationalization was carried out, and factory unions received great consultative powers in labor-management. "The unity of France demanded that hor workers morally reintegrate the national community," commented De Gaulle.

In late April and early May of 1958, Paris hummed with rumors that De Gaulle was the Army candidate for supreme power, and that he was preparing to return to office. When he finally announced his willingness to assume power, however, De Gaulle refused to comment on what policies he would pursue when in office. Unorthodox as this may seem, it is perfectly in keeping with De Gaulle's attitude toward the function of a leader, especially in domestic affairs.

For De Gaulle's whole philosophy of government assumes consensus on the meaning of "national interest," as well as the objective existence of a set of policies most likely to advance this interest. Under these conditions, a leader's duty would be to discover such a set of policies, and to persuade the nation of the necessity of accepting them. It follows that the nation's choice of a leader should be based on the confidence it places in his intellectual and political abilities, rather than on the sympathy it feels with his doctrinal convictions.

Hence it is not surprising that when the Assembly proceeded to the election of a President in 1945, De Gaulle commented, "Naturally, I abstained from submitting my candidacy or making any references to my eventual platform. They would take me as I was or not take me at all."

De Gaulle's concept of the state, as an instrument for the pursuit of the pure and unsullied national interest, under the direction of an impartial leader, men persisted in seeing a kind of capital of sovereignty, a last resort and farseeing leader, is by no means an impersonal one. Who else but De Gaulle could lead France in this fashion? If there is any one else, the General does not name him. Implicit in his entire work is the assumption that he alone is France's Man of Destiny; that, like Joan of Arc, he is unique and irreplaceable.

Commenting on his retirement in 1946, as a protest against the "Exclusive regime of parties," De Gaulle wrote these prophetic words as the passed into 12 years of voluntary isolation: "Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies had the troubling suspicion that with the General vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent. In the sidetracked selected in advance, which could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation."

Perhaps the biggest difference between De Gaulle and the Fascists lies not in the area of political philosophy, where they held many ideas in common, but rather in the deeply personal morality and greatness of soul which De Gaulle alone possess. What Hitler, in self-imposed exile, could have concluded a Mein Kampfwith these lines:

"Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storm, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

"Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

"Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!

In late April and early May of 1958, Paris hummed with rumors that De Gaulle was the Army candidate for supreme power, and that he was preparing to return to office. When he finally announced his willingness to assume power, however, De Gaulle refused to comment on what policies he would pursue when in office. Unorthodox as this may seem, it is perfectly in keeping with De Gaulle's attitude toward the function of a leader, especially in domestic affairs.

For De Gaulle's whole philosophy of government assumes consensus on the meaning of "national interest," as well as the objective existence of a set of policies most likely to advance this interest. Under these conditions, a leader's duty would be to discover such a set of policies, and to persuade the nation of the necessity of accepting them. It follows that the nation's choice of a leader should be based on the confidence it places in his intellectual and political abilities, rather than on the sympathy it feels with his doctrinal convictions.

Hence it is not surprising that when the Assembly proceeded to the election of a President in 1945, De Gaulle commented, "Naturally, I abstained from submitting my candidacy or making any references to my eventual platform. They would take me as I was or not take me at all."

De Gaulle's concept of the state, as an instrument for the pursuit of the pure and unsullied national interest, under the direction of an impartial leader, men persisted in seeing a kind of capital of sovereignty, a last resort and farseeing leader, is by no means an impersonal one. Who else but De Gaulle could lead France in this fashion? If there is any one else, the General does not name him. Implicit in his entire work is the assumption that he alone is France's Man of Destiny; that, like Joan of Arc, he is unique and irreplaceable.

Commenting on his retirement in 1946, as a protest against the "Exclusive regime of parties," De Gaulle wrote these prophetic words as the passed into 12 years of voluntary isolation: "Every Frenchman, whatever his tendencies had the troubling suspicion that with the General vanished something primordial, permanent and necessary which he incarnated in history, and which the regime of parties could not represent. In the sidetracked selected in advance, which could be invoked by common consent as soon as a new laceration threatened the nation."

Perhaps the biggest difference between De Gaulle and the Fascists lies not in the area of political philosophy, where they held many ideas in common, but rather in the deeply personal morality and greatness of soul which De Gaulle alone possess. What Hitler, in self-imposed exile, could have concluded a Mein Kampfwith these lines:

"Old Earth, worn by the ages, wracked by rain and storm, exhausted yet ever ready to produce what life must have to go on!

"Old France, weighed down with history, prostrated by wars and revolutions, endlessly vacillating from greatness to decline, but revived, century after century, by the genius of renewal!

"Old man, exhausted by ordeal, detached from human deeds, feeling the approach of the eternal cold, but always watching in the shadows for the gleam of hope!

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