THE COAL PARALYSIS

How and what to arbitrate is before the new coal conference as it was before the old. The Markle plan was, in the former case, rejected by the miners because it provided for arbitration of wages alone. They feared a conspiracy to lower wages. Equally unacceptable to the operators was the suggestion of John L. Lewis that prices, profits, and middle-man activity ought also to be regulated. Frightful visions of future bungling investigations by miscellaneous commissions arose in the minds of the owners, and they decline to consider the idea.

E. J. Lynett of the Scranton Times brought the conference together by a plan for a five year conference together by a plan for a five year contract at present wages, subject to successful negotiations at the end of two years. Because it protects against untoward wage reductions, the miners quickly accepted this scheme as a basis for conference. But the operators now object that it would freeze the wage scale, and are busy explaining that their return to conference does not mean acquiescence in Mr. Lynett's project.

Both sides seek guarantees, the one against sudden wage reduction, the other both against the snooping investigations that were latent in the first proposal of the miners and against the trap of fading profits into which a lowered coal price might turn the "frozen wage" scheme. In truth the dangers of fixed wages or prices are too real to be overlooked. A sliding scale relating wages and prices would suit the operators better, but the miners would still fear secret intrigue. With all its defects, the first proposal of the miners is the clearest of all the plans. It requires arbitration of and publicity for all the conditions of the industry, from mine to market,--including wages, prices, and profits. But the machinery needed for such an undertaking would have to be built with an impartiality and care not universal among industrial negotiators.