The Future of Germany

When Nikita Khrushchev put a slow fuse on his threat to turn Berlin over to the East German authorities, he did not act capriciously. In both preceding crises of 1958, the United States reacted more impetuously than the Soviets had calculated; the six-month period of grace on the Berlin issue was designed to provide time enough so that doubt and dissension could germinate among the Western allies.

There has, however, been no faltering on Western determination that Berlin must not become a "free" city. Such a situation would be the prelude to a communist controlled Berlin, for under almost any pretext--perhaps disorders caused by their own agents--the Soviet-assisted East Germans could sieze control entirely. But while the West's resistance to the free-city proposal deserves commendation, its failure to suggest alternate schemes is unfortunate for Germany.

Both sides recognize, of course, that the dispute over Berlin involves not only the former capital, but also the unification of Germany and the whole question of European security. The 2.2 million West Berlin residents deserve to have their precarious freedom maintained, and the preservation of this freedom by the Airlift a decade ago was one of the most inspiring Western actions in the Cold War.

East German control over the present eastern sector of Berlin does not necessarily doom the western sector. While the NATO allies must not be deluded by free-city offers, they could deal with East German border guards as agents of the Soviet troops who keep the lid on in the Democratic Republic. If these East German authorities were to attempt to cut off West Berlin then it seems the United States has rightly committed itself to preserve the sector's free status, no matter what the cost. Berlin is no rock off the China coast; it is an actual incubator of liberty. It seems doubtful, however, that the Soviets would permit their German deputies to risk a war in the face of Western unaminity on the Berlin issue.

No such unanimity exists concerning the policy we shoud adopt on German reunification as does on the problem of West Berlin. The present divided Germany, though, holds dangers for both sides. East Germany might embarrasingly erupt into rebellion against its masters, and the West might eventually face an independent West German attempt to negotiate with Moscow over East Germany. Thus preserving the status quo offers no ultimate solution.

But our present demands that a Germany unified under free elections could be allowed to make any alliances it wants, (i.e. with NATO) are patently unacceptable to Russia. On the other hand, the West must insist on eventual free determination of an all-German government.

Any unification that might be worked out in the framework of these fundamental requirements must follow a sequence of disarmament in Central Europe. Only when the Soviet Union is willing to agree to a relaxation of the Cold War in Europe can the German question be solved. To achieve any realistic result, therefore, the United States must work toward a disengagement gradual enough so that each side can take the immediate steps without feeling its security endangered. Limiting arms in Germany, setting a quota on ground forces and a prohibition on missile bases would prove fruitful as a first step in decreasing tension.

Within the next month, therefore, the Western allies should present to the Soviet Union a step-by-step proposal which first leads to limitation then reduction of forces in both Germanies and finally to free elections and reunification. A proposal which demands more faces no chance of success; a plan which concedes more might lead to disaster.