Smithies IDA Report Discusses Vietnam

War watchers squinting at the light at the end of the tunnel should read a report by Arthur Smithies. It might open their eyes.

Smithies, Ropes Professor of Political Economy and Master of Kirkland House, submitted an unpublished study on economic Vietnamization to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) presidential election.

The report predicts a continuation of the fighting and a massive American presence in Vietnam well beyond the 1972 presidential election.

"There seems no likelihood that negotiation with the North can result in rapid or early demobilization of this force (of 1.2 million South Vietnamese soldiers)," Smithies writes. "The best planning assumption seems to be military stalemate and withering away of the war, a process that can last for a decade or more..."

The study--"Economic Development in Vietnam: The Need for External Resources"--is not Smithies' only report on Vietnam, and other economists and political scientists are doing similar work for the government.

Each uncovered report is another piece in the Vietnamization jigsaw puzzle, providing a glimpse of what is to come.

When all the pieces are in place, the vision of the future promises to be a refined and mechanized version of the past. The improved model will undoubtedly surpass its predecessor in efficiency and popularity. It may also be far more long-lasting.

But the picture is still very incomplete. The Smithies report was first dredged up in a September article by Jacques Decornoy in Le Monde. In that article Decornoy also mentions a study which Emile Benoit, professor of International Business at Columbia, conducted for the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

In his semi-official report--to which Decornoy says "the State Department attaches great importance"--Benoit bases his recommendations on "a Hanoi withdrawal," an elimination of NLF influence in the South, and "the projected ending of hostilities by 1973." Reasoning along lines that resemble those traveled by Smithies, Benoit writes, "If hostilities end without a peace treaty, it seems likely that large defense budgets will persist through most of this decade." Later he notes, "Even at best, Vietnam is going to be militarily top-heavy for quite some time."

The plans of both Benoit and Smithies rest on an implied political foundation: a pro-American, anti-Communist, antisocialist government in the Republic of Vietnam. Such a government would be bolstered by enormous amounts of U.S. aid. Benoit suggests that between 1970 and 1975, the United States should supply the Republic of Vietnam with $4 billion of economic aid and defense expenditure, plus another $9 billion of military aid. Slightly less generous, Smithies proposes a stream of foreign aid amounting to $5 billion during the next decade.

Both men would like to see multilateral agencies lift some of the financial burden from the sweating shoulders of the American colossus. However, the distasteful political system they posit will repel most nations. Smithies' plan takes that into account. "The most suitable multinational arrangement would be a consortium (including) the U.S., Japan, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Korea and the Philippines," he writes. "But the club should not be exclusive. Canada, for instance, should be included."

In his eagerness to graft capitalist enterprise onto the Vietnamese economic organism, Smithies ignores possible rejection reactions caused by the incompatibility of American-style free enterprise with Vietnamese cultural beliefs. As Alexander B. Woodside, assistant professor of History, observed, "All Vietnamese intellectuals, Communist or not, think in terms of the collective management of the economy." Yet Smithies' concern with the "market system" is overriding. Discussing the distribution of a agricultural inputs and sale of outputs, he notes, "The record of government performance so far is not impressive." Some might attribute this failure to government corruption and inefficiency. Smithies sees it as a confirmation of the advantages of free enterprise. "Strong encouragement should be given to private enterprise in this area," he writes.

Insensitivity to Vietnamese culture has been a keystone of American policy. Smithies devotes a few paragraphs to the people whose future he is planning. "The population is hardy and vigorous, particularly those that have come from the North," reads a typical passage. "The Chinese influence and incessant wars over the centuries have produced hardier stock than has (sic) Cambodia, Thailand and other countries that have been subject to Indian influence."

The American influence has overshadowed that of the Chinese in recent years. And while Smithies details many of the disasters--soaring rise in imports, festering corruption, defoliated forests, etc.--he is quick to note the advantages the Americans offer along with their gift of war. "The war has provided Vietnam with paved highways from end to end, with more airfields than it can possibly use, with spectacular harbors, with an elaborate communications system, with power plants, and with potable water in Saigon," he explains, adding, "While it is impossible to make an accurate inventory of the changes in the infrastructure during the war, the impression is inescapable that the plusses greatly outweigh the minuses."

The Smithies report is not a piece of serious academic work; it is more a roughshod analysis scraping along the surface. It is a product of a policymaker, although some of the policies, such as the aid allotments, are clearly unrealistic. Smithies' assumptions are more interesting than his conclusions.

The report opens with a discussion of alternatives. Examining the spectrum of political possibilities, Smithies resembles a man who has lost all but his most peripheral vision. He simply cannot see straight ahead. From the corner of his right eye he observes that "military security may be sufficient to permit the economy to operate under market forces and to be oriented toward the world economy with respect both to trade and the use of foreign capital." Sneaking a glance toward the left, he recoils at the sight of "full incorporation in the economy of North Vietnam," an arrangement leaving "little doubt that the South would be exploited by the North."

Smithies proceeds "on the assumption that the first alternative, which is clearly preferable, is also feasible." He is unable to envision a coalition government somewhere in between, a government that would combine collectivist holding patterns with a non-Communist framework.

Did Smithies make these political assumptions himself or did he act on specifications prepared by the IDA? That is one of the unanswered questions. Smithies refused to talk on the record: "I don't try to get into political controversy," he said. Probably he chose to posit a rightwing political administration, largely because that is the contingency he is academically equipped to handle. But the question misses the point. When the IDA gave him the contract, it knew the sort of work he was likely to do. That was the sort of work it wanted.

The American government has been interested in Smithies' work for a long time. In April 1969 students occupying University Hall opened the files of then Dean of the Faculty Franklin L. Ford and found a letter from Arthur Smithies. Dated December 7, 1967, the letter read: "The Central Intelligence Agency has instructed its consultants to inform their official superiors of this connection with the Agency. I hereby inform you of my connection of ten years duration. I wish I could add that there is something subtly interesting or sinister about it." On the bottom Ford scrawled, "Acknowledge, Should we have a little confidential file on such relationships outside personal folders?"

A continuing consultant with the IDA under contract with the Vietnam Bureau of the Agency for International Development (AID), Smithies frequently visits Vietnam. He was in Saigon this summer. Author of several reports not intended for publication, he is now working on a State Department project based at the Columbia School of International Affairs (CSLA).

The Columbia project has a new twist: contingency planning. It will study the possible role of multilateral machinery in the economic rehabilitation of North and South Vietnam, and it will "analyze alternative local political conditions within which any international program might have to work."

Ruth B. Russell, research associate at the CSLA, is the researcher who is coordinating the project. Her field of academic interest is multilateral agencies. Allan E. Goodman, an assistant professor at Clark University and a former Harvard graduate student, will consider political possibilities. Smithies will examine "the order of magnitude of the overall requirement for external assistance" and the probable willingness of different sources to contribute to a multilateral aid program.

Both Goodman (in the April Asian Survey) and Smithies have written recently about topics closely related to the ones they are now studying. The contract took affect June 15 and the final report is due March 1. The budget is a meager $42.935, with only $2000 chalked for travel. Smithies said he has not yet begun his part of the report.

The modest amounts of time and money allocated to this project suggest that it will not be of major significance. The fact that two of the three principals have recently completed similar research suggests that they will present rehashed versions of their work for this report. Surely the State Department could have used its own people to present a coherent document.

So why did it bother with Columbia?

Russell said that she is doing the project because of her interest in international organization. "The question is now how much money you want, but how much can you get, and how do you mobilize international resources," she said. "How much can you get the international community to mobilize, and what is the effect of the political conditions in Vietnam?"

But while she was clear on her own motivation, Russell could only guess about State's. "The reason why various people in the State Department might have found our proposals of interest probably varies with each of the people," she remarked. "Even Mr. Nixon probably has multiple motivations regarding the situation over there."

When asked why the State Department should go to Columbia rather than write an in-house report, Russell seemed annoyed. "I'm quite sure they have people capable of doing it, but they have a lot of other things to do," she snapped.

Thomas Judd, Senior Program Officer of the Division of External Research of the State Department and the officer supervising the project said, "Our primary purpose is to see if anybody on the outside has ideas on reconstruction of Vietnam, especially the multilateral thing."

Judd agreed that the people involved in the project--in particular, Smithies and Goodman--have already done similar work. "We need people with the right background who have done thinking in this area," he said. "They don't have to get out with the plow and plow up the ground all over again.

Noting that the project received a relatively small budget and short time schedule, Judd said. "This thing is primarily a mental exercise. Certain facts are known and readily available. Beyond that it's a question of brainpower, how ingenious you are."

"By asking people to work on specific projects where we define exactly what it is we're looking for, we can contribute to our thinking." Judd said a few minutes later. "We try to make all our stuff policy-oriented. It doesn't amount to churning out great amounts of fresh thinking."

The contract provides for at least two and possibly three consultations between the Columbia researchers and State Department officials, presumably to "define exactly what it is we're looking for."

The report will not be classified, but it will not necessarily be published. Russell pointed out the economic difficulty in finding a university press that would publish the work, and added that she could not yet be sure whether the finished product would merit publication. The Department of State could publish it, but Judd said so far there are no such plans. The extent to which the report is circulated will depend on how "useful" it is, Judd said.

Columbia won the contract after competing with the Fletcher School at Tufts and five other universities. "Most schools wouldn't go near it," Russell said. Judd concurred.

"You people so intimidated academic institutions out there that they don't want to touch these things with a ten-foot pole," he complained. "They act like a bunch of chickens. They think they'll be pecked by you hawks out there. They skirted around this one till they were sure it wasn't booby-trapped."

Universities are wary about government contracts because their institutional memories recall the 1968 Columbia student disorders, in which demonstrators focused much of their protest on the IDA. At that time the IDA was controlled by a group of universities, including Columbia. After the violence at Columbia the universities bowed out of the IDA, and it became an independent corporation.

Now the State Department is funding a project at Columbia with a staff including Arthur Smithies, an IDA consultant.

Probably the Administration hopes to restore broken bonds with the universities: maybe it thinks it can convert some of its critics and please its supporters by allowing them a token role in policy formation. Some of these reports are undoubtedly bureaucratic waste destined to line file cabinets. The Columbia study in particular, though, may be used to help gain Congressional funds for a multilateral agency to prop up a Thieu-ish regime. Like the Smithies and Benoit reports, it is a minor scenario for the tragicomedy of Vietnamization.

Vietnamization is tragic because it is the final stage of a devastating attack on a people and a culture. It is bitterly comic because the people who protested so vehemently two years ago have now forgotten.

At Harvard, enrollment in History 182c, "Modern Vietnam," has plummeted from 195 last Spring to half that number this Fall. A dozen people showed up at the first meeting of Sam Popkin's graduate seminar on "Revolution and Politics in Vietnam." Four people are enrolled in "Elementary Vietnamese." China courses are packed. Nixon's ploy appears to be working.

Bombs are still falling, people are still dying, but already nobody cares. Visitors to Vietnam this summer repot that Thieu seems to have the country under control. When American troops and even planes are no longer needed, when only American money is required to back up a corrupt and unpopular government, when no American blood is demanded to dominate a small, oppressed nation--when the American war has ended and only American repression remains, who will remember?

Already it is easy to forget simple truths. What role should the U.S play in the economic rehabilitation of Vietnam? "Before you can do anything, there are two things that have to be done," Alexander Woodside said. "First, a terminal date for withdrawal of all U.S. troops has to be set. Second, a broad invitation from all groups, including Communists, must request assistance. Until that happens it's just more of the same. And more of the same deserve to be resisted."

The Smithies report is more of the same.Wide World PhotosA B-52 drops bombs on suspected NLF strongholds in South Vietnam. As Vietnamization improves in efficiency, U.S. troops can be withdrawn. If the ultimate in efficiency is achieved, bombers can be recalled as well, and a pro-American regime will be left standing.