A Japanese View: Frustration with the War And Confusion Over China's Revolution

A POPULAR Japanese axiom is that "An Asian can best understand the Asian." Yet it might be presumptuous to assume that simply because we Japanese are Asians that we are in better position to understand and offer solutions to Asian problems. I think, however, that there is a distinct Japanese view of the Vietnamese war, perhaps not a wiser one, but one that differs in some ways from what might be called the American view. For one thing, we do not look upon the Viet Cong as an enemy. We look at them merely as one of the concerned parties of this unfortunate war. As a Japanese newspaperman I can say that they are never described in the press as the enemy. Indeed newsmen take very cautious effort not to translate directly into Japanese the word "enemy" which appears so often in American news agency dispatches about the Viet Cong. A trivial thing it might seem, but one which is closely related to the basic difference between American and Japanese opinion.

As far as the Vietnam war is concerned, we (Japanese) are determined to maintain a relatively neutral policy, carefully guarding against any deep commitment to either side. But having a security treaty with the United States, we are one of its close allies. The Japanese government has publicly, if only nominally, supported the American Vietnam policy. Yet the Japanese government assistance to the South Vietnamese government has been minimal, limited to the sending of token assistance of some medical care stuffs. We feel that total commitment to either side, at this stage, will not contribute anything to the peaceful solution of the bloody war. What we are trying to do by this policy is keep the option open for either side to seek a Japanese arbitration effort.

Disturbing Aspects of American Policy

In Asian eyes it is a fact that some aspects of the American Vietnam policy seem sometimes disturbing. For example, the bombing of North Vietnam does constitute an outright attack on a sovereign state by another without any declaration of war. Even assuming that America is capable of innovation in every aspect of war, the bombing is not a welcome precedent for a nation that has long been known for its moralistic foreign policy. We certainly respect the American ability at self-control which the sophisticated idea of a step-like escalation seems to demonstrate, but the logic of escalation itself seems very alien to us. It looks like beating somebody with one hand, while asking at the same time for a gentlemanly discussion with him. Should he accept the invitation, he has surrendered; this might be honorable for the hitter but not for the other fellow. Accepting the cruel realities of international politics, I don't think this is the ideal way to negotiation. I have some doubts as to how effective the escalation policy is, when applied to the Asian condition.

Certainly the Vietnamese people, both North and South, are extremely friendly to the Japanese on principle--which is nice psychologically for the Japanese--but things remain only on a simple level. We have no strong economic and cultural ties as the French retain in that area. Nor were we participants of the Geneva Convention that constructed the peace set-up in 1954 for Southeastern Asia. We have a relationship with Communist China, but it is not so close as to permit us to exert any influence upon them. We have a good relationship with the Soviet Union, but not as close as our American one. Though Japan is frequently cited as a major power in Asia, with the exception of some limited influence on Indonesia, we have no substanital political sway over Asian countries. As a matter of fact, we are frustrated in finding that there is so little we can do towards bringing an end to the Vietnamese conflicts.

But shall we renounce any attempt to mediate? We shall not. The expectation of the Japanese people and of the world for a Japanese role in this matter is so high as not to permit renunciation. We are reaching the conclusion that the best way is, though it is slow and indirect, to build up politically and economically as a true power. We are certanily tired of being a "mock-up" of a major power.

In welcoming and seeking any move intended towards peace, we expect more flexibility in American policy. We believe in the ability and the wisdom, not the arrogance of America as the world's most powerful nation. If the war is going to be escalated radically, the threat of a Chinese-American war and the fear of involvement in such war will dramatically change the whole picture. Because the Japanese have had a deeply felt fear of being involved in a Chinese-American war.

Japan and China

JAPAN has enjoyed an extraordinary peace since the Second World War. We have never felt the sense of being threatened by external forces, mainly because of the United States nuclear defense umbrella. In this atmosphere a particular image or feeling about Communist China has grown up. Of course there has been a wide variety of opinion but, in the main, feeling about China has been good. To some Japanese, mostly Communists and socialists, China has been the potential champion of the progressive forces of the world. Furthermore, a sense of guilt for the criminal acts of the Japanese army towards the Chinese people during World War II and a sense of the long Japanese historical, cultural and religious ties with China have contributed to the general good feeling towards China.

The first blow to this rosy picture of China occurred when China succeeded in the explosion of a nuclear bomb. In the eyes of the Japanese, the only people who have had the experience of being attacked by a nuclear bomb, the Chinese nuclear armament was real military threat. It was not a step towards total and complete disarmament as the Chinese claim.

The second and most vital blow came from the present turmoils of the so-called Great Cultural Revoluiton. The violent and sometimes ridiculous path of the revolution his disgusted and dismayed the bulk of nations, except for those socialists, who claim to be fervent pro-Chinese.

The effects of the current turmoil in China on the Japanese is worthy of detailed analysis. Although we suffer, like the Americans, from a scarcity of reliable information from China, argument about China has dominated almost every publication in Japan. And I think it might be possible to suggest a spectrum of Japanese thought about the Cultural Revolution and to separate several types of thought within this spectrum.

THE FIRST TYPE -- This group includes those who denounce the Cultural Revolution as a sheer power struggle within the power structure. Many Japanese who went to China to investigate the situation during the turmoil belong to this type. They argue that a) the Cultural Revolution is merely a power struggle, b) the chief characteristic of Maoism is an agriculturally centered radicalism of the petty Bourgeoisie, c) the current Chinese concept of "commun" will mean a "commune-guarded-by-the-bayonette" because of the deification of Mao, and d) by labeling dissenters as enemies, Maoism soon will be equatable with Stalinism.

THE SECOND TYPE--This classification is made up of those who unconditionally support the direction of the Cultural Revolution. This type of reaction, though a minority one, claims that Maoism is the only philosophy capable of standing against those of the western world.

THE THIRD TYPE--Members of this group fall somewhere in between the first two types and they might be called "critical sympathizers." Criticism of the deification of Mao is very scarce among members of this group, but they also urge a deeper understanding of the meaning of the Cultural Revolution. Some argue that the Revolution may be the most gigantic experiment in remolding human nature that has ever been attempted--an experiment, which they claim, the Soviet Union could not and dared not embark upon. They point out that there is a considerable difference between Stalinism and Maoism because 1) the Chinese purges are bloodless, 2) the philosophy behind this Revolution is based on a theory of class struggle within a socialist society, and 3) Stalin did not have a plan for establishing "communes." A considerable portion of the Japanese intellectual community falls into this category.

THE FOURTH TYPE--Includes many Sinologists who emphasize the the strength of the traditional characteristics of Chinese society in the whole process of the Revolution. They see the idea of the traditional Chinese emperor revived in Maoism and also note a strong trait of Confucianism in the Cultural Revolution. They counsel more cautious judgment on the current turmoils and advocate a greater attempt at understanding Chinese society.

Perhaps the most conspicuous fact about the Japanese reaction to the Revolution is the extent of disillusionment among pro-Chinese intellectuals. They have begun to look at the process of the Revolution with more realistic eyes than before. This profoundly affects the over-all Japanese attitude towards the China problem and towards all Asian problems. Officials of the Japanese government, who once seriously worried of the danger of a Chinese-American war, are now more optimistic because of the Revolution. They now dismiss the possibility of such a war and even dismiss the possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam now. Apparently the many elements which had composed the basic picture of China have been changing and with them the picture's color and texture have changed.

China's Future Role

We now believe that Communist China will not be a major force in Southeast Asia in the near future. China will remain an essentially backward country which will be incapable of competing even with the influence of Japan in Asia. On the other hand, we see no sign of a peaceful solution at present. The general impression of the Japanese is that this will be a long drawn-out war.

The Japanese Role in Asia

From these two evaluations emerge two lanes for Japanese diplomacy. One lane is to keep ourselves away from the Vietnam war as much as possible; another is to commit more of our resources to the building up of the economic prosperity of Southeast Asia. We will never take the leadership position on this. The bitter memory of the Japanese occupation is still too vivid in the memories of the Asian nations to permit such a turn of events.

We will take the position of a modest brother who has some previous experience and some resources of modernization. The launching of the economic Ministerial Conference of Southeast Asian countries last year has been a move in this direction and we are not pessimistic about its prospects.

But when speaking in general on American policy in Asia, I sometimes feel it strange that despite these fine scholars and experts in America--such as at Harvard--and a most up-to-date assortment of materials from Asia, Americans suffer from many mis-judgments in their Asian policy. Is the reason a lack of intercourse between scholars and the administration? Or is it a general lack of understanding about Asian problems among the American people? Probably this is a partial explanation. Or is it that America has some sort of limit in the understanding of Asia? I think not, and hope not. Asia is fast changing. I have no doubt that Americans will be able to keep up with the pace of the new changing Asia.